Pickle v Johnson
2018 NY Slip Op 06954 [165 AD3d 994]
October 17, 2018
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, November 28, 2018


[*1]
 Paula Pickle, Appellant,
v
Jarel M. Johnson, Respondent.

Friedman Sanchez, LLP, Brooklyn, NY (Fabien Robley of counsel), for appellant.

Dodge & Monroy, P.C., Lake Success, NY (Mark T. Scopinich of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Arthur G. Pitts, J.), dated November 15, 2016. The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she alleges she sustained on June 23, 2011, when the motor vehicle she was driving collided with a motor vehicle driven and owned by the defendant, in Shirley, Suffolk County. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion. The plaintiff appeals.

The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained serious injuries to her left shoulder and the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Rivera, J.P., Miller, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2016 NY Slip Op 32288(U).]