LaSalle Bank, N.A. v Bouloute |
2010 NY Slip Op 51513(U) [28 Misc 3d 1227(A)] |
Decided on August 26, 2010 |
Supreme Court, Kings County |
Schack, J. |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
LaSalle Bank, N.A.,
AS TRUSTEE FOR FIRST FRANKLIN MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-2, MORTGAGE
LOAN ASSET- BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-2, Plaintiff,
against Jules Paul Bouloute, et. al., Defendants. |
This renewed motion by plaintiff,
In my February 4, 2009 decision and order in this matter, I denied plaintiff LASALLE's
original motion for an order of reference with leave to renew within sixty (60) days, provided
certain conditions were met. Plaintiff LASALLE timely made the instant motion and met these
conditions. However, my further examination of the assignment of the instant mortgage from the
original mortgagee, FFFC, by MERS, its nominee, to LASALLE raises concern that the
assignment is defective.
Defendant JULES PAUL
BOULOUTE (BOULOUTE) executed the subject
mortgage and note on March 14, 2007, borrowing $540,000.00 from FFFC. MERS
[*2]
"acting solely as a nominee for Lender [FFFC]"
and "FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE
OF RECORD," recorded the instant mortgage and note on April 3, 2007, in the Office of the
City Register of the City of New York, at City Register File Number (CRFN) 2007000170876.
Plaintiff BOULOUTE allegedly defaulted in his mortgage loan on July 1, 2007.
Then, MERS, as nominee for FFFC, assigned the instant nonperforming mortgage and note
to plaintiff LASALLE, on October 15, 2007. This assignment was recorded in the office of the
City Register of the City of New York, on November 26, 2007, at CRFN 2007000585455. The
assignment was executed by Eileen J. Gonzales, Assistant Vice President of MERS, as nominee
for FFFC. However, as will be discussed below, there is an issue whether MERS, as FFFC's
nominee, was authorized by FFFC, its principal, to assign the subject BOULOUTE mortgage
and note to plaintiff LASALLE.
MERS, as described above, recorded the subject mortgage as "nominee" for FFFC. The word "nominee" is defined as "[a] person designated to act in place of another, usu. in a very limited way" or "[a] party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others." (Black's Law Dictionary 1076 [8th ed 2004]). "This definition suggests that a nominee possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a principal whom the nominee serves." (Landmark National Bank v Kesler, 289 Kan 528, 538 [2009]). The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Landmark National Bank, 289 Kan at 539, observed that:
The legal status of a nominee, then, depends on the context of
the relationship of the nominee to its principal. Various courts have
interpreted the relationship of MERS and the lender as an agency
relationship. See In re Sheridan, 2009 WL631355, at *4 (Bankr. D.
Idaho, March 12, 2009) (MERS "acts not on its own account. Its
capacity is representative."); Mortgage Elec. Registrations Systems,
Inc. v Southwest, 2009 Ark. 152 ___, ___SW3d___, 2009 WL 723182
(March 19, 2009) ("MERS, by the terms of the deed of trust, and its
own stated purposes, was the lender's agent"); La Salle Nat. Bank v
Lamy, 12 Misc 3d 1191 [A], at *2 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006]) . . .
("A nominee of the owner of a note and mortgage may not effectively
assign the note and mortgage to another for want of an ownership interest
in said note and mortgage by the nominee.")
The New York Court of Appeals in MERSCORP, Inc. v Romaine (8 NY3d 90 [2006]), explained how MERS acts as the agent of mortgagees, holding at 96:
In 1993, the MERS system was created by several large [*3]
participants in the real estate mortgage industry to track ownership
interests in residential mortgages. Mortgage lenders and other entities,
known as MERS members, subscribe to the MERS system and pay
annual fees for the electronic processing and tracking of ownership
and transfers of mortgages. Members contractually agree to appoint
MERS to act as their common agent on all mortgages they register
in the MERS system. [Emphasis added]
Thus, it is clear that MERS's relationship with its member lenders is that of agent
with the lender-principal. This is a fiduciary relationship, resulting from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another, allowing the other to act on his behalf, subject to his control
and consent. The principal is the one for whom action is to be taken, and the agent is the one
who acts.It has been held that the agent, who has a fiduciary relationship with the principal, "is a
party who acts on behalf of the principal with the latter's express, implied, or apparent authority."
(Maurillo v Park Slope U-Haul, 194 AD2d 142, 146 [2d Dept 1992]). "Agents are bound
at all times to exercise the utmost good faith toward their principals. They must act in
accordance with the highest and truest principles of morality." (Elco Shoe Mfrs. v Sisk,
260 NY 100, 103 [1932]). (See Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Development Corp., 96 NY
409 [2001]); Wechsler v Bowman, 285 NY 284 [1941]; Lamdin v Broadway Surface
Advertising Corp., 272 NY 133 [1936]). An agent "is prohibited from acting in any manner
inconsistent with his agency or trust and is at all times bound to exercise the utmost good faith
and loyalty in the performance of his duties." (Lamdin, at 136).
Thus, in the instant action, MERS, as nominee for FFFC, is an agent of FFFC for limited purposes. It can only have those powers given to it and authorized by its principal, FFFC. Plaintiff LASALLE has not submitted any documents demonstrating how FFFC authorized MERS, as nominee for FFFC, to assign the subject BOULOTTE mortgage and note to plaintiff LASALLE.
Recently, in Bank of New York v Alderazi, 28 Misc 3d at 379-380, my learned colleague, Kings County Supreme Court Justice Wayne Saitta explained that:
A party who claims to be the agent of another bears the burden
of proving the agency relationship by a preponderance of the evidence
(Lippincott v East River Mill & Lumber Co., 79 Misc 559 [1913])
and "[t]he declarations of an alleged agent may not be shown for
the purpose of proving the fact of agency." (Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v
Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 122 AD2d 25 [2d Dept 1986]; see
also Siegel v Kentucky Fried Chicken of Long Is. 108 AD2d 218 [2d
Dept 1985]; Moore v Leaseway Transp/ Corp., 65 AD2d 697 [1st Dept
1978].) "[T]he acts of a person assuming to be the representative of
another are not competent to prove the agency in the absence of evidence
tending to show the principal's knowledge of such acts or assent to them."
(Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 122 AD2d
at 26, quoting 2 NY Jur 2d, Agency and Independent Contractors § 26).
Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to demonstrate that the [*4]
original lender, the mortgagee America's Wholesale Lender, authorized
MERS to assign the secured debt to plaintiff.
Therefore, in the instant action, MERS, as nominee for FFFC, failed to establish that it had
authority from FFFC to assign the BOULOUTE mortgage. The Court is denying plaintiff
LASALLE's renewed application for an order of reference, with leave to renew if plaintiff
LASALLE can demonstrate how MERS had authority from FFFC to assign the BOULOUTE
mortgage and note to LASALLE.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, that the renewed motion of plaintiff,
ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR FIRST FRANKLIN MORTGAGE LOAN
TRUST 2007-2, MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES
2007-2
ENTER
________________________________HON. ARTHUR M. SCHACK
J. S. C.