Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Joseph Esposito, J.), entered January 7, 2008. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant Gina Cyriaque's motion to vacate a default judgment.

Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed without costs, defendant Gina Cyriaque's motion to vacate the default judgment denied and default judgment reinstated.

Plaintiff's subrogor owned a motor vehicle which, in 2001, was involved in an accident with a motor vehicle allegedly owned by defendant Gina Cyriaque and operated by defendant Lanquze B. Gesley. As a result of the accident, the vehicle of plaintiff's subrogor sustained damage, resulting in plaintiff's payment of $8,384.27. Thereafter, plaintiff commenced this subrogation action against defendants. Upon defendants' default, the action was discontinued without prejudice against defendant Lanquze B. Gesley, and a judgment in the principal sum of $8,384.27 was entered against defendant Gina Cyriaque in May of 2004.

In July of 2005, defendant Gina Cyriaque (hereinafter defendant) moved to vacate the [*2]default judgment and to restore the action to the calendar. The parties stipulated to vacate the judgment and she submitted an answer stating that she had insurance at the time of the accident. When defendant failed to appear on the next court date, the original default judgment was reinstated. Defendant again moved to vacate the default judgment, and the parties again stipulated to vacate the judgment. Thereafter, defendant failed to appear on the trial date and the default judgment was reinstated for a second time. Defendant subsequently sought vacatur of the reinstated judgment, submitting a statement which merely provided that her vehicle had been insured. In opposition, plaintiff's counsel submitted a September 2004 notice of disclaimer from defendant's carrier indicating that it had disclaimed coverage based upon its failure to receive notification of the lawsuit. Defendant's motion was granted, resulting in an order which, inter alia, vacated the reinstated default judgment.

A party seeking to vacate a default judgment must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; see also Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; Putney v Pearlman, 203 AD2d 333 [1994]). While the determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default generally lies within the sound discretion of the motion court (see Grutman v Southgate At Bar Harbor Home Owners' Assn., 207 AD2d 526, 527 [1994]; Bergdorf Goodman Inc. v Hillard, 1 Misc 3d 127[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51544[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2003]), reversal is warranted where the motion court has improvidently exercised its discretion (see Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568 [1997]). Furthermore, where the record demonstrates a pattern of default or neglect, the default should be considered intentional and, therefore, not excusable (see Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead v Jablonsky, 283 AD2d 553 [2001]). In the instant case, defendant's consistent and repeated defaults demonstrated a pattern of neglect, and the default should not be excused. We conclude that it was an improvident exercise of discretion for the Civil Court to have granted defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment.

We note that in view of our finding that defendant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the default, it is unnecessary for us to address the issue of whether a meritorious defense was demonstrated.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, defendant Gina Cyriaque's motion to vacate the default judgment is denied, and the default judgment is reinstated.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 24, 2009