HSBC Bank USA v Perboo |
2008 NY Slip Op 51385(U) [20 Misc 3d 1117(A)] |
Decided on July 11, 2008 |
Supreme Court, Kings County |
Schack, J. |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
HSBC Bank USA,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE FOR PEOPLE'S CHOICE HOME
LOAN SECURITIES TRUST SERIES 2006-1, Plaintiff,
against Marcie Perboo et. al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff's application, upon the default of all defendants, for an order of reference, for the
premises located at 689 Eldert Lane, Brooklyn, New York (Block 4274, Lot 14, County of
Kings) is denied without prejudice. The "affidavit of merit" submitted in support of this
application for a default judgment is not by an officer of the plaintiff or someone with a power of
attorney from the plaintiff. Leave is granted to plaintiff
Further, plaintiff must address a second matter if it renews its application for an order of
reference upon compliance with CPLR § 3215 (f). In the instant action, as noted above,
Victor F. Parisi, in his affidavit, dated December 14, 2007, states he is Vice President of
EQUITY ONE. Yet, the September 28, 2007 assignment from MERS as nominee for PEOPLE'S
CHOICE to HSBC is signed by the same Victor F. Parisi, as Vice President of MERS. In my
November 20, 2007 decision and order in
Also, while MERS served as nominee for PEOPLE'S CHOICE, the mortgage servicer for the PERBOO mortgage was POPULAR MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. [POPULAR], [exhibit B of application - July 24 default letter to PERBOO], whose address is 121 Woodcrest Road, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003. The MERS as nominee for PEOPLE'S CHOICE to [*3]HSBC assignment lists HSBC's address as 121 Woodcrest Road, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003. The instant verified complaint [part of exhibit B of application] states that EQUITY ONE'S address is 121 Woodcrest Road, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003. How convenient to have the assignor's servicer, the assignee's servicer and the assignee all at the same address. This makes for one-stop shopping! The Court needs to know what corporate chicanery is being played at 121 Woodcrest Road, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003. Is the building large enough to house POPULAR, EQUITY ONE, MERS and HSBC under the same roof? Is there enough closet space to store Mr. Parisi's various corporate hats?
Last, the verified complaint notes, in ¶ 6, that defendant PERBOO defaulted with her
February 1, 2007 principal and interest payment. The first sentence in the July 24,
2007-POPULAR default letter to defendant PERBOO states "[p]lease be advised that your
account is presently in default." On September 28, 2007, 240 days after the instant mortgage loan
ceased to perform, and 72 days subsequent to the POPULAR default letter to PERBOO, plaintiff
HSBC accepted the assignment of the instant nonperforming loan from MERS as nominee for
PEOPLE'S CHOICE. The Court needs a satisfactory explanation of why HSBC, whose directors
have a fiduciary responsibility to HSBC's shareholders, purchased a nonperforming loan from
MERS as nominee for PEOPLE'S CHOICE, in an affidavit by an officer of HSBC.
Real Property Actions
and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) § 1321 allows the Court in a foreclosure action, upon the
default of the defendant or defendant's admission of mortgage payment arrears, to appoint a
referee "to compute the amount due to the plaintiff." In the instant action, plaintiff's application
for an order of reference is a preliminary step to obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and
sale. (Home Sav. Of Am., F.A. v Gkanios, 230 AD2d 770 [2d Dept 1996]).
shall file proof of service of the summons and the complaint, or
a summons and notice served pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule
305 or subdivision (a) of rule 316 of this chapter, and proof of
the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due
by affidavit made by the party . . . Where a verified complaint has
been served, it may be used as the affidavit of the facts constituting
the claim and the amount due; in such case, an affidavit as to the
default shall be made by the party or the party's attorney. [Emphasis
added].
Plaintiff has failed to submit "proof of the facts" in "an affidavit made by the
party." The "affidavit of facts" is submitted by Victor F. Parisi, "Vice-President of, EQUITY
ONE, INC. AS AUTHORIZED SERVICER FOR HSBC." Mr. Parisi, must have,
Also, the instant application upon defendants' default must be denied because even
though it contains a verified complaint, the attorney's verification is insufficient to
meet the requirements of CPLR § 3215 (f). The Court, in Mullins v Di Lorenzo, 199
AD2d 218 [1st Dept 1993], instructed that "a complaint verified by counsel amounts to no more
than an attorney's affidavit and is therefore insufficient to support entry of judgment pursuant to
CPLR 3215." Citing Mullins v Di Lorenzo, the Court, in Feffer v Malpeso, 210
AD2d 60, 61 [1st Dept 1994], held that a complaint with not more than an attorney's affidavit, for
purposes of entering a default judgment "was erroneous and must be deemed a nullity." Professor
David Siegel, in his Practice Commentaries (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR
C3215: 16) explains that Mullins v Di Lorenzo
is in point here. Perhaps the verified complaint can do service as
an affidavit for various purposes within the litigation while the contest
is on . . . but it will not suffice to put an end to the contest with as
drastic a step as a default at the outset. It must be kept in mind that
even an outright "affidavit" by the plaintiff's attorney on the merits
of the case— except in the relatively rare circumstances in which the
attorney happens to have first-hand knowledge of the facts—lacks
probative force and is usually deemed inadequate by the courts to
establish the merits. A fortiori, a verified pleading tendered as proof
of the merits would also lack probative force when the verification is
the attorney's. [Emphasis added]
In Blam v Netcher,
17 AD3d 495, 496 [2d Dept 2005], the Court reversed a default
judgment granted in Supreme Court, Nassau County, holding that:
In support of her motion for leave to enter judgment against
the defendant upon her default in answering, the plaintiff failed to
proffer either an affidavit of the facts or a complaint verified by a
party with personal knowledge of the facts (see CPLR 3215 (f):
Goodman v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. 2 AD3d 581
[2d Dept 2003]; Drake v Drake, 296 AD2d 566 [2d Dept 2002];
Parratta v McAllister, 283 AD2d 625 [2d Dept 2001]). Accordingly,
the plaintiff's motion should have been denied, with leave to renew
on proper papers (see Henriquez v Purins, 245 AD2d 337, 338
[2d Dept 1997]).
(See Hazim v Winter, 234 AD2d 422 [2d Dept 1996]; Finnegan v
Sheahan, 269 AD2d 491 [2d Dept 2000]; De Vivo v Spargo, 287 AD2d 535 [2d
Dept 2001]; Peniston v Epstein, 10
AD3d 450 [2d Dept 2004]; Taebong Choi v JKS Dry Cleaning Eqip. Corp., 15 AD3d 566 [2d
Dept 2005]; Matone v Sycamore Realty
Corp., 31 AD3d 721 [2d Dept 2006]; Crimmins v Sagona Landscaping, Ltd., 33 AD3d 580 [2d Dept
2006]).
Therefore, the instant application for an order of reference is denied without prejudice, with
leave to renew. The Court will grant plaintiff HSBC an order of reference when it submits: an
affidavit by either an officer of HSBC or someone with a valid power of attorney from HSBC,
possessing personal knowledge of the facts; an affidavit from Victor F. Parisi clarifying his
employment and what corporation he serves as an officer; and an affidavit from an officer of
[*5]HSBC explaining why HSBC purchased a nonperforming
loan from MERS as nominee for PEOPLE'S CHOICE, and why HSBC, MERS, POPULAR and
EQUITY ONE all share office space at 121 Woodcrest Road, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003.
ORDERED, that the application of plaintiff,
ORDERED, that leave is granted to plaintiff,
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
ENTER
___________________________
HON. ARTHUR M. SCHACK
J. S. C.