In this asbestos personal injury action, defendants American Standard Inc. ("American Standard") and its division, Westinghouse Air Brake, move for an order granting them summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs' common-law product liability and negligence claims are preempted by the Federal Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. 20701 et seq. (the "BIA"), and the Federal Safety Appliances Act, 49 U.S.C. 20301 et seq. (the "SAA"). In opposition, plaintiff concedes that the product liability claims are barred, but argues that nevertheless he can assert negligence claims against movants that allege that they violated the BIA and SAA. Plaintiff also cross-moves for an order amending its complaint to assert those claims. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted and the cross-motion is denied, and summary judgment is granted to movants.

Facts Plaintiff Joseph Caradonna, who worked as a mechanic and welder for the Long Island Rail Road ("LIRR") from 1949 to 1977, alleges that he contracted asbestos-related disease from inhaling dust while servicing trains at various LIRR yards. He filed suit in 2006 against the LIRR, the Metropolitan Transit Authority and various manufacturers, sellers and distributors of asbestos-containing products. Plaintiff sues American Standard individually and as the successor to Westinghouse Air Brake Company, which allegedly manufactured asbestos-containing train brake shoes that the LIRR used on locomotives and rail cars.

Discussion Under the doctrine of Federal preemption, the BIA occupies the entire field of locomotive regulation, and the SAA occupies the entire field of rail car safety appliance regulation. See Napier v. A. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926) (BAA); S. R. Co. v. R.R. Commn. of Ind., 236 U.S. 439, 446 (1915) (SAA). Field preemption by the BIA and SAA applies not only to State legislative regulation, but also to State common-law claims. Seaman v. A.P. Green Indus., 184 Misc 2d 603, 605 (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 2000) (citing cases); S. R. Co., 236 U.S. at 446. Preemption extends to tort claims against railroad equipment manufacturers as well as claims against railroad operators. Seaman, 184 Misc 2d at 605; Law v. Gen. Motors Corp., [*2]114 F.3d 908, 911-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding BIA barred tort claim against locomotive brake manufacturer).

Moreover, a railroad worker who alleges that BIA or SAA violations caused his or her injury on the job is limited to bringing claims against the railroad employer under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § § 1 et. seq. ("FELA"). NY C. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1917). FELA provides the exclusive remedy for railroad workers, who cannot maintain separate negligence actions against their employers or third parties. NY C. R.R. Co., 244 U.S. at 149-50; 45 U.S.C. § 51.

Accordingly, all claims against American Standard and its division are barred. Plaintiff's reliance on Feldman v. CSX Transp., Inc., 31 AD3d 698 (2d Dept. 2006), is misplaced. In Feldman, the Appellate Division found that a non-railroad employee alleging injury due to a violation of the SAA "must look for a remedy in a common-law tort action since he or she has no federal cause of action available [under FELA]." 31 AD3d at 703. In this case, plaintiff is a railroad employee who is limited to a FELA claim.

The cross-motion to amend the complaint is denied, inasmuch amendment would be futile.

ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint as against defendant American Standard Inc. and its division, Westinghouse Air Brake, is severed and dismissed, and it is further

ORDERED that the cross-motion for leave to amend the complaint is denied, and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Dated: April 5, 2007___________________________

Helen E. Freedman, J.S.C.



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